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Abstract
Anxiety can have both detrimental and facilitatory cognitive effects. This study investigates the neural substrates of a
replicated facilitatory effect of anxiety on sustained attention and response inhibition. This effect consisted of improved
performance on the Sustained Attention to Response Task (a Go–NoGo task consisting of 91% Go and 9% NoGo trials) in
threat (unpredictable electrical shock) vs safe (no shock) conditions. This study uses the same experimental design with
fMRI and relies on an event-related analysis of BOLD signal changes. Findings reveal that threat-related cognitive facilita-
tion (improved NoGo accuracy) is associated with greater activation of a right-lateralized frontoparietal group of regions
previously implicated in sustained attention and response inhibition. Moreover, these same regions show decreased activa-
tion in the Go trials preceding NoGo errors. During NoGo trials, striatal activity is also greater in the threat vs safe condition,
consistent with the notion of enhanced inhibitory processing under threat. These findings identify potential mechanisms
by which threat of unpredictable shock can facilitate distinct cognitive functions. A greater understanding of the complex
interaction of the anxious state and cognitive processes may have critical clinical implications.
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Introduction
Anxiety is known to alter behavioral and cognitive functions.
While anxiety can impair performance through cognitive inter-
ference (Eysenck et al., 2007; Robinson et al., 2013b), it can also
improve performance, putatively through heightened arousal
(Malmo, 1957), sensory processing (Baas et al., 2006; Grillon and
Charney, 2011) or facilitated motor inhibition (Sehlmeyer et al.,
2010; Robinson et al., 2013a; Chiu et al., 2014). This study tests
the neural mechanisms underlying such effects. We recently
showed in two separate cohorts that anxiety induced by threat
of shock improved NoGo performance accuracy (reduced NoGo
commission errors) on the Sustained Attention to Response
Task (SART) by possibly facilitating vigilance and/or behavioral
inhibition (Robinson et al., 2013a; Grillon et al., 2015). Using a
similar task, Sehlmeyer et al. (2010) found that high trait anxiety
was also associated with reduced NoGo commission errors and
concluded that anxiety enhanced response inhibition. Anxiety-
induced behavioral inhibition is consistent with models accord-
ing to which anxiety prompts hypervigilance and inhibition of
prepotent responses (Gray and McNaughton, 2000) and with the
observation that anxiety causes freezing and avoidance behav-
iors (Lang et al., 2000). This study provides novel data on the
neural mechanisms underlying these effects, using our same
empirical approach, but in the fMRI environment.
SART consists of the presentation of frequent ‘Go’ stimuli
interspersed with rare ‘NoGo’ stimuli, which require withdraw-
ing prepotent ‘Go’ responses. Accordingly, SART probes two
main cognitive processes, sustained attention and motor inhibition
(Robertson et al., 1997; Helton, 2009). The engagement of sus-
tained attention is required to maintain task goals, while inhib-
ition is required to withhold prepotent responses. The high
repetitiveness of Go stimuli endows responses to these stimuli
with prepotency, and, consequently, requires strong response
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inhibition to withdraw motor responses to rare NoGo stimuli
(Peebles and Bothell, 2004; Helton, 2009). This design also re-
quires the maintenance of a state of preparedness for the NoGo
stimuli. Therefore, during the long succession of sequential Go
trials, sustained attention is the dominant active process, and
response inhibition is in a primed state. Conversely, during
NoGo trials, motor inhibition is the primary active process.
Sustained attention and response inhibition have been
mapped to specific neural networks (here we use ‘network’ to
refer to consistent coactivations and acknowledge that a more
appropriate use of this word necessitates structural or functional
connectivity analyses). The sustained attentional network has
typically been assigned to right-lateralized prefrontal and parietal
regions (Manly et al., 2003; Fassbender et al., 2004; O’Connor et al.,
2011; Sakai et al., 2013). The response inhibition network involves
regions in the right inferior frontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex (dACC) and basal ganglia (Bush et al., 2000; Garavan
et al., 2006; Aron et al., 2014). Accordingly, neuroimaging studies
have shown that SART engages right-lateralized regions (Helton
et al., 2010; Stevenson et al., 2011) localized to the right inferior
frontal cortex, dACC, parietal cortex and basal ganglia (Manly
et al., 2003; Fassbender et al., 2004; Sakai et al., 2013).
The few studies that have examined the effects of “anxiety”
on sustained attention have used either exposure to acute
threat cues (Wilson et al., 2015), or have studied individuals with
high trait anxiety (Righi et al., 2009; Forster et al., 2015) (see
Shackman et al., 2006 for caveats to these approaches).
Although these works have not directly examined the effects of
an enduring state of apprehension, their findings can inform
predictions. Specifically, they reported increased activation of
the regions involved in sustained attention (Pannu Hayes et al.,
2009; Koric et al., 2011; Sylvester et al., 2012). In addition, transi-
ent aversive states can improve response inhibition during
SART (Wilson et al., 2015). However, studies in high trait anxious
individuals have revealed contradictory findings of both im-
proved and impaired response inhibition performance. A study
reported that trait anxiety was associated with reduced com-
mission errors during SART, an effect attributed to high level of
cognitive control based on measure of brain electrical activity
(Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). However, another study reported slower
Go reaction time together with reduced activation of cognitive
control regions (Bishop, 2008; Forster et al., 2015).
This study uses threat of shock and safety from shock
(Alvarez et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2013b) with the SART to
probe sustained attention and response inhibition. Given im-
proved SART performance under threat, three hypotheses are
tested separately: (i) activity patterns implicated in sustained
attention would be potentiated (i.e. made stronger) by threat of
shock in the contrast of threat vs safe condition during Go trials;
(ii) Errors of commission (EoC) would be preceded by a lesser en-
gagement of these attention-related activations, consistent
with attentional lapses. We also predicted that the regions
altered in this manner would be consistent with those regions
affected by anxiety in the first hypothesis. (iii) Finally, prefrontal
regions implicated in motor inhibitory control would be
strengthened by threat of shock in the contrast of threat vs safe
during correct NoGo trials.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Thirty-seven, right-handed, healthy adult volunteers were re-
cruited from a mixed urban and suburban population through
Internet listservs, flyers and print advertisements. Exclusion cri-
teria included: (i) current or past Axis I psychiatric disorder as
assessed by SCID-I/NP (First et al., 2007), (ii) first degree relative
with a known psychotic disorder, (iii) a medical condition con-
flicting with safety or design of the study, (iv) brain abnormality
on MRI as assessed by a radiologist, (v) positive toxicology
screen, (vi) MRI contraindication or (vii) excessive head motion
during the functional scans. For reasons detailed below, the
final analysis included 31 subjects between the ages of 18 and
39. Written, informed consent was approved by the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Combined Neuroscience
Institutional Review Board and obtained from all subjects. All
subjects were compensated for their time.
Shock procedure
The threat of shock procedure was based on a translational psy-
chophysiology paradigm (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) adapted for
neuroimaging (e.g. Robinson et al., 2012). Prior to the task, sub-
jects completed a work-up procedure to control for individual
differences in shock tolerance and to titrate the shock intensity
to a level that was highly uncomfortable and aversive but not
painful. The subjects were told that they could receive an un-
predictable number of randomly generated shocks during the
threat conditions. In actuality, one 500-ms shock was delivered
to the left wrist (DS7A; Digitimer, UK) twice, during the first half
of the two fMRI runs.
Task design
Go/NoGo trials were presented for 500 ms in an event-related
design with a centered “¼” symbol representing Go trials and
“o” representing NoGo trials. The distribution of trial types con-
sisted of 91% Gos and 9% NoGos distributed across two runs.
Each trial was separated by 1500–2500 ms of jittered inter-trial-
interval (blank slide that varied in presentation time). Each run
consisted of six 2-min blocks of two conditions (three blocks of
safe from shock, and three blocks of threat of shock) and the order
of condition presentation was counterbalanced across subjects.
The phrases “You are now safe from shock” or “You are now at
risk of shock” were shown at the start of each condition and,
after these instructions, a blue border surrounded safe trials
and a red border surrounded threat trials. Each run was 13 min
12 s (26 min 24 s total). Subjects were asked to rate their subject-
ive anxiety, fear and happiness over the intercom after each run
(scale: 1 not at all to10 extremely). Stimuli were presented on a
projection screen with E-Prime 2.0 (Psychological Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) including 20 s of fixation at the beginning
and end for estimating baseline.
Behavior: threat vs. safe conditions
Subjective measures, performance measures [accuracy, re-
sponse time (RT) and response time variability (RTV)] were com-
pared between threat and safe conditions using paired t-tests
across both runs. Correlations were calculated between percent
NoGo accuracy and Go response time variability.
In addition, for the second analysis, the RT of the four trials
preceded NoGos was averaged, partitioned according to
whether they preceded EoC or correct NoGos, and a repeated
measures 2  2 ANOVA with the factors condition (threat/
safe)accuracy (EoC/correct) was performed. Behavior analyses
were conducted in Microsoft Excel 2011 (Redmond, WA) or SPSS
v. 21 (Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).
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Functional image acquisition and preprocessing
Scanning was performed on a 3-T Siemens Magnetom Skyra
with a 32-channel head coil. The 1-mm isotropic structural scan
was a T1-weighted MPRAGE with the following parameters:
TR¼ 1.9 s, TE¼ 2.13, acquisition matrix¼ 256  256, Slice thick-
ness 0.9 mm, flip angle 9. The functional EPI had a TR of 2 s,
TE¼ 30 ms, flip angle 70, 35 slices, acquisition matrix¼ 64  64,
3  3  3 mm voxels, and 396 images collected for each run.
Subjects were provided earplugs, a pillow beneath their knees
for stability, and foam padding was used to further constrain
head movement.
All preprocessing and analyses were performed with AFNI
(Cox, 1996). Subjects’ functional volumes were slice-time and
motion corrected, coregistered to their structurals using a Local
Pearson Correlation algorithm optimized for EPI and T1-
weighted scans (Saad et al., 2009), normalized to the N27-
Talairach template, and smoothed with a 6-mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel within a mask of voxels that had valid data at
every TR. Adjacent TRs with a Euclidean Norm motion deriva-
tive>0.3 mm were censored (3.16 2.4% TRs per participant).
Furthermore, subjects with>10% of their TRs censored from
such head motion were removed from the study, leaving 31 of
37 total scanned subjects. This final group of 31 consisted of 14
females and 17 males (average age¼ 2866).
Individual subject regressions were performed with AFNI’s
3dDeconvolve. Each trial event was convolved with a gamma HRF
and all data was high-pass filtered with six low-frequency poly-
nomial regressors. Covariates of non-interest included six head
movement parameters, incorrect NoGo trials, instruction
screens and the two electric shocks. Covariates of interest are
described below. Group analyses were performed within a
whole brain mask created from an average of each subject’s in-
dividual masks binarized to 95%. The cluster extent (ke) of cor-
rected statistical results was also estimated within this mask
using an average of all subjects’ spatial smoothness computed
with 3dFWHMx. A Monte Carlo simulation using 3dClustSim then
determined that voxel level P¼ 0.001, ke¼13 was corrected for
multiple comparisons at P< 0.05, whole brain. This threshold
was also used to establish statistical significance across the fol-
lowing three random-effects, group-level analyses:
To test hypothesis 1, analysis 1 used 3dANOVA2 to compare
correct Go trials in a Threat vs Safe contrast. Events of interest
were correct Gos in the threat and safe conditions. As others
have done (Forster et al., 2015), this analysis used activation dur-
ing Go trials to examine sustained attention and proactive
control. Note that the 2-min condition blocks were not directly
modeled in these analyses; only contrasts of individual trial
types were constructed.
To test the second hypothesis, analysis 2 investigated brain
activity preceding EoCs. Our modeling established a primary
contrast between the four Go trials preceding incorrect NoGos
(4go-I) and the four Go trials preceding correct NoGos (4go-C), as
our group and others have previously done (Robertson et al.,
1997; Christoff et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2013a). The main ef-
fect of 4go-I vs 4go-C was used to examine mechanisms of at-
tention lapses across conditions. Accordingly, two regressors of
interest were added for this second analysis, the sets of four Go
trials that preceded incorrect NoGos (4go-I) and the sets of four
Go trials that preceded correct NoGos (4go-C). Two subjects
were eliminated because they made no EoCs during at least one
of the conditions, yielding 29 subjects for this analysis. Finally,
all other Go trials and all NoGo trials in the threat and safe con-
ditions were included as covariates of no-interest in addition to
those covariates mentioned above. Three regions of interest
were chosen from the results of Analysis 1 and subsequently
probed in a post hoc manner with 3dROIstats to clarify the direc-
tion of Analysis 2 effects via regression betas. We selected those
regions from analysis 1 that seemed to overlap with the results
of analysis 2 to test the hypothesis that the effects of attention
lapses acted on the same or similar network that supported im-
proved sustained attention.
Analysis 3 tested the effects of threat on NoGo trials to probe
our hypothesis 3 of the effects of anxiety on response inhibition
in the full sample of 31 subjects. This analysis was modeled at
the individual subject level identically to the analysis 1, except
for using correct NoGo trials instead of Go trials as the regres-
sors of interest.
In addition, we conducted a validation control analysis, for
which we constructed a statistical map of the main effects of Go
trials across conditions to check that the event timings were
modeled correctly and that the combination of TR and range of
inter-trial stimulus intervals could capture hemodynamic re-
sponses adequately.
Results
State manipulation. As expected, subjects reported more anxiety
(5.06 2.2 threat, 2.061.3 safe), more fear (3.762.1 threat,
1.460.9 safe) and less happiness (4.262.1 threat, 6.36 1.8 safe)
during the threat compared to the safe condition (all Ps<
0.0001).
Behavioral performance
Accuracy. Figure 1 shows NoGo and Go accuracy separately for
the threat and safe condition. The improved NoGo accuracy
during threat (0.756 0.2) compared to safe (0.6760.2) was sig-
nificant (t(30) ¼ 4.45; P¼ 0.0001; Cohen’s d¼ 0.42). Go accuracy
was high and tended to also be improved in the threat
(0.9876 0.03) compared to the safe (0.98260.03) conditions
(t(30)¼2.01; P¼ 0.053).
EoCs varied by trial type and condition, with the mean and
[range] reported as follows: threat EoCs: 7.2, [1–17], threat cor-
rect NoGo trials: 19.7, [10–26], safe EoCs: 9.3, [1–19], and safe cor-
rect NoGo trials: 17.7, [8–26]. Note that these numbers should be
multiplied by 4 when considering the second analysis probing
trials preceding EoC.
Fig. 1. Percent accuracy within trial type and condition. Error bars¼ s.e.m.
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Response time (RT). Three measures of response time are
reported:
Go-RT: There was no significant difference of overall Go
response time (Go-RT) between the threat and safe conditions
(t¼ 0.62(30); P¼ 0.54), indicating that the improved NoGo accu-
racy during threat was not due to a speed-accuracy trade off.
Furthermore, Go-RT was not correlated with Go-accuracy in
either condition (threat: r ¼ 0.05, ns; safe: r ¼ 0.11, ns).
Go-RTV: Overall Go-RTV was also not influenced by threat.
However, greater Go-RTV was associated with worse NoGo
accuracy, both in the threat (r¼0.54, P¼ 0.002) and safe
(r¼0.57, P¼ 0.0009) conditions. Therefore, lower RT variabil-
ity was indicative of better performance.
4Go-RT: For RT of the four trials preceding either incorrect (4go-
I) or correct (4go-C) NoGo trials, a 2-way (NoGo Accuracy,
Condition) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of NoGo accuracy [F(1, 28)¼16.46, P< 0.001; g2¼
0.37], indicating faster 4go-I than 4Go-C. No other effects were
significant.
Functional imaging
Analysis 1: This first analysis examined the effects of threat vs
safe on correct Go trials. Results showed greater activation in
threat vs safe in regions previously associated with inhibition
and sustained attention (Figure 2). Specifically, these threat-
related effects were segregated to the right hemisphere: middle
frontal gyrus (MFG), medial frontal pole, ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (vlPFC), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), anterior insula, and
caudate nucleus (Table 1).
Analysis 2: This second analysis examined neural predictors
of EoCs. Four Go trials immediately preceding NoGo EoCs (4go-I)
were compared to four Go trials preceding NoGo correct
responses (4go-C). Whole brain results showed greater deactiva-
tions in 4go-I trials relative to 4go-C trials in right MFG
(Brodmann’s Area (BA) 9), bilateral IPL (BA40), and bilateral
vlPFC/anterior insula (BA45/13) (Figure 3A, Table 1).
Three of these clusters (rMFG, rIPL, rvlPFC/anterior insula) in
Analysis 2 closely overlapped with the results from Analysis 1.
Thus, a post hoc analysis was conducted to better understand
the effects of threat/performance in these clusters. Accordingly,
analysis 2 betas pulled from a single mask of all three activation
clusters garnered from Analysis 1 were decomposed by threat
and safe. This analysis revealed that the pattern of stronger
deactivation associated with impaired performance during
safety was reduced during threat (Figure 3B).
Analysis 3: This third analysis examined the effects of threat
vs safe on correct NoGo trials. Two brain areas, a midbrain
region consistent with the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the
right putamen, showed greater activity in the threat than safe
conditions during NoGo trials (Figure 4A). Figure 4B pulls regres-
sion betas from these regions and shows significant activation
to NoGo trials during threat, but no activation during safe.
A post hoc analysis was also performed with the subjective
anxiety measure that followed the imaging runs. We chose
three of the observed regions from the threat vs safe Go trials
analysis (Analysis 1) to pull regression betas for correlations
(MFG, vlPFC/anterior insula and IPL). These regions were chosen
because they were also observed in Analysis 2. We also created
masks in two ways: (i) masks formed from the activation cluster
shapes themselves and (ii) spherical masks (8-mm radius) cen-
tered on the center of mass of those clusters and therefore not
biased by activation cluster size. This created 3  2¼ 6 correla-
tion tests that necessitated Bonferroni correction (P¼ 0.05/
6¼ 0.0083). There was a robust positive correlation that survived
correction (r¼ 0.55, P¼ 0.0014) of right MFG with reported anxi-
ety during the threat of shock condition (see Figure 5).
The check for event-related modeling accuracy confirmed
that the left motor network (for a right-handed button-press)
was activated in response to all Go trials. The regions involved
in this network included the contralateral supplementary motor
Fig. 2. All Go trials, in a Threat vs Safe contrast. Maps corrected at T>63.65, P<0.001, k¼13, N¼31. Results in this and subsequent figures are overlaid on an average of
all subject’s normalized structural scans. Numbers represent Z levels in Talairach space. See also Table 1A.
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area, hand motor cortex, ventrolateral thalamus and putamen,
and ipsilateral cerebellum. On visual inspection, this map was
also compared to an automated meta-analysis of imaging stud-
ies using the search term “finger” (Yarkoni et al., 2011)
and a near identical match was observed (see Supplementary
Figure S1).
Discussion
State anxiety, tested here as an experimentally-induced endur-
ing state of apprehension, has been shown to consistently
improve performance on the SART, a sustained attention task
requiring motor inhibition (Robinson et al., 2013a; Grillon et al.,
2015). While replicating the anxiety-related performance
improvement, this study provides novel data on the neural cor-
relates of these effects. Predictions were 3-fold. First, anxiety by
threat of shock would potentiate activation of regions involved
in sustained attention. Second, the activity of these same
regions would be altered in trials preceding NoGo errors. Finally,
anxiety would reinforce inhibitory processes during NoGo
responses.
Threat vs safe of Go trials. In line with predictions, anxiety during
Go trials potentiated activation in right-lateralized frontoparie-
tal regions, which are known to be structurally inter-connected
(Umarova et al., 2010; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2011) and have
been consistently associated with sustained attention (Pardo
et al., 1991; Sarter et al., 2001; Husain and Rorden, 2003; Langner
and Eickhoff, 2013). These regions included right prefrontal
areas within MFG/DLPFC and vlPFC/BA47/anterior insula (see
Figure 2, upper right), and the IPL (BA40). Similarly threat-
related increased activations were found in the right caudate
nucleus.
The right prefrontal-parietal network has previously been
reported in SART imaging studies (Manly et al., 2003; Grahn and
Manly, 2012). For example, Sakai et al. (2013) conducted a para-
metric modulation analysis of fMRI data collected during SART
performance using block-based mean Go-RT. They found that
right DLPFC and bilateral intraparietal sulcus were positively
correlated with Go RT, suggesting that greater activation of the
attention network reduced impulsive or automatic responses,
indexed by speeded RT. These findings echo the results of this
study, i.e. the association of threat-related improved accuracy
with enhanced activation in a right frontoparietal network. As
Table 1. Peak coordinates for three analyses
Hemisphere Region BA # voxels x y z mT score
A: Threat vs Safe, GO trials
R Caudate – 96 10 2 20 3.89
R Orbital gyrus 47 51 32 22 6 4.09
R Frontal superior gyrus 8 20 8 46 44 3.85
R MFG 9 16 34 38 32 4.01
R Parietal inf-Supramar gyrus 40 19 50 28 32 3.86
R Parietal inf-Supramar gyrus 40 13 52 44 36 3.85
B: four GOs before EoC; incorrect vs correct
R MFG 9 45 35 44 27 4.08
R IPL 40 19 47 47 54 4.31
R Inf. frontal gyrus/ant insula 45/13 23 38 29 6 4.19
L Insula 13 16 38 5 9 4.02
L IPL 40 15 62 35 36 4.18
C: Threat vs Safe, NOGO trials
R Putamen – 14 26 4 8 4.12
– VTA – 13 2 20 10 4.20
A: Analysis1: Threat vs Safe, Go trials. B: Analysis2: four trials prior to EoC vs four trials prior to correct NoGos. C: Analysis3: Threat vs Safe, NoGo trials. Coordinates are
in Talairach space and T statistics reported as the mean of each cluster.
Fig. 3. (A) Four trials prior to EoC vs four trials prior to correct NoGos across conditions (safe and threat). From left to right: less activation in right ventrolateral PFC,
MFG and right IPL (arrows). See Table 1B for additional regions. N¼ 29. Coloring and thresholding of statistics are the same as in Figure 2. (B) Regression coefficients for
Go trials just previous to either correct or incorrect NoGos. Beta coefficients are averaged between the three regions highlighted at left, and separated by condition
(safe: blue, threat: red) and type of NoGo accuracy they precede. Error bars¼ s.e.m.
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such, anxiety would facilitate sustained attention by strength-
ening the attention network. In support of this interpretation,
the activation of the corresponding MFG/DLPFC region tracked
self-reported anxiety during threat (Figure 5).
Furthermore, a meta-analysis of insula function found that
the anterior insula peak shown connected to vlPFC/BA47 in
Figure 2 plays a robust role in the attentional domain as well
(Kurth et al., 2010). In fact, the three frontoparietal regions
shown in Figure 2, but further investigated in Figure 3B (vlPFC,
MFG and IPL), may also constitute the largely right-lateralized
ventral attention network (VAN) (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Corbetta et al., 2008). To further explore this notion, we com-
pared, in a post hoc manner, their peak coordinates to the corre-
sponding peaks of regions reported in a large resting state study
(Thomas Yeo et al., 2011). The current SART peak coordinates
were found to be between 7 and 17 mm Euclidian distance away
from the Thomas Yeo et al.’s VAN node peak coordinates. The
VAN typically responds to conditions of target detection and
reorientation to behaviorally-relevant oddballs and unpredict-
able events (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Kim, 2013). This type
of response is consistent with the behavioral responses to
SART’s NoGo trials. However, more recent research has broad-
ened the conceptualization of the VAN response profile to
include rare event expectation (Corbetta et al., 2008; Vossel et al.,
2014). Our findings of an enhanced right-lateralized group of
regions during Go trials give further support to this broadened
definition of the VAN, and is especially appropriate in our shock
paradigm given this network’s alleged involvement in anxiety
disorders (Sylvester et al., 2012).
Besides an attention-related interpretation, inhibitory proc-
esses are also invoked by the SART. Anxiety can facilitate a sus-
tained state of readiness to inhibit motor responses to the rare
and unpredictable NoGo trials. This state of readiness might
also be conceptualized as proactive inhibitory control (Aron,
2011; Sakai et al., 2013). The right inferior prefrontal cortex
together with right parietal areas have also been consistently
implicated in response inhibition (see review, Aron et al., 2014).
Unfortunately, this study does not permit us to behaviorally dis-
sociate sustained attention from proactive inhibition. However,
the strong potentiation of the caudate during the threat condi-
tion is consistent with a strengthening of inhibitory mecha-
nisms. Indeed, the striatum has been shown to play a critical
role supporting anticipation of response withdrawing, suggest-
ing that anxiety might recruit striatal function to maintain a
state of readiness to inhibit (Chikazoe et al., 2007; Zandbelt and
Vink, 2010; Jahfari and Waldorp, 2011). This consideration also
fits with the propensity for anxious individuals to withdraw
from novel or uncertain stimuli (Fox et al., 2005; Clauss et al.,
2014). Taken together, these findings call for future work that
could dissociate the effects of anxiety on proactive inhibitory
processes from sustained attention.
Trials preceding NoGo errors (4go-I) vs correct NoGo trials (4go-C).
To determine which regions might specifically be related to task
performance errors, we compared, in a second analysis, Go tri-
als before correct vs incorrect NoGo trials, i.e. during compro-
mised sustained attention. In line with expectations, across
threat and safe conditions, significantly less activation of the
right frontoparietal attention network was observed during the
Go trials that preceded EoCs (incorrect NoGo trials) compared
with those that preceded correct NoGo trials. Critically, these
regions largely overlapped with the frontoparietal regions iden-
tified in the first analysis (see also Figure 3B). Therefore, these
results suggest that threat improves performance through the
same group of brain regions (vlPFC, MFG, IPL) that disengage
when performing the task incorrectly.
In addition, the caudate nucleus was not differentially
affected in the 4go-I vs 4go-C contrast. This suggests that the
recruitment of the caudate nucleus in the first analysis (threat-
go vs safe-go) was specific to the effects of threat, rather than
purely performance modulation. The third analysis may help
Fig. 5. Right MFG beta coefficients from correct Go trials in Threat vs Safe con-
trast and correlated with subjective report of anxiety during threat blocks.
r¼0.55, P¼ 0.0014.
Fig. 4. All correct NoGo trials, in a Threat vs Safe contrast. N¼31. (A) VTA and putamen. (B) Betas from regions, red¼under threat, blue¼ safe from threat. See also
Table 1C.
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distinguish the effects of threat on sustained attention from
those interacting with response inhibition.
Threat vs safe of NoGo trials. The contrast of threat vs safe during
correct NoGo trials revealed greater activation to threat vs safe
only in two subcortical clusters, the right putamen and a mid-
brain region consistent with the VTA (D’Ardenne et al., 2008;
Murty et al., 2014). These findings depart from our prediction
that threat would strengthen inhibitory prefrontal control
regions, including right IFG and dACC when having to inhibit
pre-potent responses (Aron et al., 2014). Of note, the right IFG
was strongly activated in response to correct NoGo trials (results
of main effect of NoGo trials not shown). However, it was not
potentiated by threat, which may likely be because only correct
NoGo trials were included in the analysis. Nonetheless, the
findings from Threat vs Safe of NoGo trials suggests that striatal
subcomponents such as the putamen contribute to both proac-
tive (Go) and reactive (NoGo) inhibition (Aron, 2006; Zandbelt
and Vink, 2010).
While this study informs the cognitive effects of state anxi-
ety, it is important to contrast these findings with previous
work on trait anxiety for two reasons. First, it is important to
recognize the difference between these two expressions of anxi-
ety, because their clinical implications can lead to different
interventions. Second, the neural mechanisms underlying trait
anxiety is dissociable from those underlying state anxiety,
although they present commonalities (Bijsterbosch et al., 2015).
Indeed, the extent to which findings based on state anxiety
could overlap with findings on trait anxiety is an important
question. Sehlmeyer et al. (2010) reported findings consistent
with ours, that is, high trait anxiety was associated with better
response inhibition reflected in reduced NoGo EoCs. These
authors’ conclusion that anxiety trait was related to enhanced
response inhibition was in line with our current finding.
Sehlmeyer et al.’s study is significant given that we (submitted
for publication) recently found excessive response inhibition in
individuals with anxiety disorders, suggesting that response
inhibition could be a vulnerability factor for such conditions.
However, others failed to find that trait anxiety improved
response inhibition (commission errors). Righi et al. (2009) found
no effect of trait anxiety on SART performance, but reported
increased (interpreted as inefficient) cortical activity associated
with NoGo trials. Forster et al. (2015) reported that trait anxiety
was associated with slower Go RT in the context of unimpaired
NoGo performance. Concurrently, high trait anxiety was associ-
ated with reduced recruitment of cognitive control areas during
NoGo trials. These findings, opposite to our results, support the
argument that high state anxiety and high trait anxiety are not
identical and could be dissociated (Bijsterbosch et al., 2015). This
is further exemplified by other work which links anxiety to
impoverished attentional function (Bishop et al., 2004; Ansari
and Derakshan, 2011; Kalanthroff et al., 2016). In the case of the
work by Derakshan et al., for example, these authors primarily
examine trait anxiety without manipulating state anxiety
(Derakshan et al., 2009) and when they manipulate emotional
states they use punctual affective stimuli that capture attention
and compete for attentional resources over a short period of
time (Bishop et al., 2004; Kalanthroff et al., 2016), as opposed to
the induction of sustained anxiety during threat of shock.
Therefore, future research is needed to disambiguate the
nuanced relationship of state vs trait anxiety to brain function
and performance.
A final critical issue is the potential contribution of increased
arousal to our findings. Conceivably, our findings may reflect a
non-specific increase in arousal during the threat condition,
which would counteract an under-arousal supposedly gener-
ated by the typical SART performance. Under-arousal would
lead to absentmindedness, perceptual decoupling, and ulti-
mately attention lapses (Robertson et al., 1997). Threat, by
increasing arousal, would prevent the deleterious effects of
under-arousal on SART performance. However, this proposition
would be invalidated by another view of SART, which does not
rest on arousal levels. According to this view, NoGo EoCs are not
caused by attention lapses, but actually reflect response inhibi-
tion errors (Helton and Warm, 2008; Helton, 2009; Helton et al.,
2009). Along with this argument, five other reasons mitigate the
arousal interpretation of our findings. First, SART does not typi-
cally induce under-arousal. In fact, SART was designed to be of
short-duration (Robertson et al., 1997), and is relatively cogni-
tively demanding and accordingly requires a high level of
arousal (Helton et al., 2009). Second, emotions, including anxi-
ety, are arousing and motivate specific action tendencies, such
as inhibitory tendencies in anxiety (Chiu et al., 2014).
Accordingly, consistent with our results, a recent study reported
that aversive cues improved NoGo accuracy and appetitive cues
improve Go accuracy (Chiu et al., 2014). These findings cannot
be interpreted in terms of general non-specific arousal. Third,
we showed that high levels of state anxiety, as measured with
fear-potentiated startle (Grillon and Baas, 2003), were associated
with improved NoGo accuracy, but at the expense of Go accu-
racy, suggesting that anxiety promoted a cautious action ten-
dency, rather than non-specific increased arousal (Grillon et al.,
in preparation). Fourth, vigilance tasks are not necessarily
improved by increased arousal. Helton’s group showed that
increasing arousal with negative pictures impaired rather than
improved performance on a vigilance tasks (Helton and Russell,
2011; Ossowski et al., 2011) and van Steenbergen et al. (2011)
demonstrated a dissociation of attentional effects between
threat and arousal. Finally, the brain regions most implicated in
general arousal (e.g. reticular formation, basal forebrain, locus
coeruleus, raphe nuclei or central thalamus) were not detected
in the Go trials contrast of Threat vs Safe. However, despite
these arguments, it would be important to design an experi-
ment that manipulates arousal and threat orthogonally to prove
or disprove the unspecific hyper-arousal theory.
This study presents a number of strengths and limitations.
With regard to strengths, anxiety was manipulated in a within-
subject design using well-established methods of anxiety induc-
tion and measurement (Grillon and Baas, 2003). Secondly, this
study uses SART, a cognitive paradigm that has shown to be
modulated in a consistent fashion by anxiety, a finding repli-
cated here. Thirdly, this study uses separate analyses to show
that a collection of lateralized regions are involved in both anxi-
ety and performance in a way that complement each other. In
other words, we show that this set of regions is involved in
response to anxiety, which putatively reduces performance
errors. With regard to limitations, the design of this study did
not permit to fully dissociate the effects of anxiety on the corti-
cal correlates of sustained attention vs inhibitory control.
Another drawback concerns our inability to identify with high
spatial precision the midbrain structure activated in the third
analysis. Finally, although we took the same approach of many
other investigators, the second analysis probing Go trials prior
to EoCs may have been underpowered because it was based on
subjects’ variable performance, and relatively small number of
trials. Therefore, the results of this analysis should be inter-
preted with caution.
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In conclusion, this study brings novel insights into the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying the interaction of anxiety, defined
here as an enduring state of apprehension, with cognitive and
behavioral processes, and particularly those involved in
anxiety-related performance improvement on a sustained
attention task. Threat of shock strengthens the recruitment of
the right frontoparietal attention network, which, conversely,
becomes less engaged before incorrect performance. The insula
follows the same pattern of activation, and may play a role in
increasing sustained attention. Finally, threat of shock recruits
striatal structures, which might more specifically support a
motor inhibitory function, during both proactive control (Go tri-
als) and reactive control (NoGo trials). The present findings
open important questions for future studies, particularly about
the nature of cognition impacted by anxiety (i.e. sustained
attention vs inhibitory control) and about the role of midbrain
regions in these processes. Ultimately, understanding how
anxiety modulates cognitive performance can have critical
implications for understanding individuals with pathological
anxiety, and how the mechanisms identified herein contribute
to the symptoms of anxiety disorders.
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